Personal Identity, Existence and What Matters

It will be useful to begin with an extensive introduction to personhood in general.

Like many other terms, philosophers oftentimes use the word 'person' differently from

the colloquial use of the word. This colloquial use is usually meant to be singular for

'people', or to mean 'a human being'. Although philosophers do use the word in these

ways, they also use it in yet another way. Our first question, then, I will call The

Personhood Question: "What is it to be a person?" That is, what makes persons different

from non-persons? What do persons have that non-persons do not have? Are human

beings the only candidates for persons or are there (or could there be) nonhuman persons?

Many philosophers throughout history have discussed these questions and

suggested answers to them. A common trend from the Early Modern Period of Western

philosophy (specifically Descartes and Locke) was to favor the mental aspect as essential

to personhood. For Descartes, you are your mind. That is, you are an immaterial

substance that thinks. The Cartesian view of personhood is thus associated with the

person's soul. Locke similarly described a person as, "a thinking intelligent being, that

has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in

different times and places."1 According to him, you are a conscious being that persists by

means of continued consciousness and memory. For both Descartes and Locke, a person

is a conscious agent capable of interacting with and experiencing the world and

generating plans or desires upon which to act.